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ABSTRACT  
Redistributive taxation should benefit those with low earnings capacity rather than those who 
choose a lower income to obtain tax savings. Several contributions have highlighted how 
public provision of work complements can discourage people from lowering labour supply to 
diminish taxable income. We show how tax avoidance, previously neglected, can alter the 
conclusions regarding public provision. Tax avoidance breaks the link between labour supply 
and reported income. An agent reducing his reported income to escape taxes may no longer 
forego a publicly provided labour complement because he may now lower his income by 
avoiding more rather than working less. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A key issue in public economics is how to combine taxes and public expenditures to achieve 
the desired redistribution and revenue-raising at low efficiency costs. Within the optimal tax 
literature, several contributions have highlighted the welfare-enhancing role of using public 
provision of certain private goods as an instrument to alleviate labour supply discouragement 
and other tax-induced distortions, for instance by lowering the cost of working.1 So far, 
however, the literature on this topic has largely abstracted from any tax evasion or avoidance. 
In this paper we integrate the research on taxes and public provision with the research on how 
people evade taxes by underreporting true income, or find more sophisticated and elaborate 
ways to shelter income from taxation – known as tax avoidance. We find that tax avoidance 
affects how we would like to use public provision as part of redistributive policy. 
A basic insight from the conventional literature is that public provision of a good 
should favour those who actually have a low earnings capacity rather than those who choose a 
low income through low labour supply despite having a higher earnings capacity. For this 
reason there is a case for supplying goods that are complements with labour supply. However, 
when avoidance is possible, agents with higher earnings capacity can choose lower reported 
income by underreporting income without lowering labour supply, or even in combination 
with increased labour supply. They could work more to earn what is now tax-free income at 
the margin. Working more, agents with high earnings ability but low observable income will 
benefit more from the publicly provided commodity. Also without working more, these 
                                                 
1 The literature on the welfare-enhancing role of public provision of private goods as a policy instrument in 
Mirrleesian optimal tax models has been developed in a series of papers since the mid-Nineties. The main 
contributions include Blomquist and Christiansen (1995), Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari 
(1997), Balestrino (2000), Pirttilä and Tuomala (2002) and Blomquist et al. (2010). 
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agents may value the good more since they have more (evaded) income to spend. In either 
case, a good appropriate for public provision with full income reporting may no longer be 
suitable when there is tax avoidance.      
Even where those able agents who choose a low income would like to consume more 
than those with lower earnings ability, public provision may be socially efficient in certain 
circumstances. Suppose that an agent has to choose between accepting an amount that is 
publicly provided free of charge or fully acquiring the commodity in the market (say choosing 
public or private health care). Then, the agent with the lower valuation of the commodity may 
be the beneficiary if a small amount (or a low quality) is provided. The reason is that the agent 
with the higher valuation may find the public provision inadequate and opt for the market 
alternative, foregoing the benefits of public provision. However, who are the agents with a 
low valuation, preferring public provision, may in some cases depend on whether people have 
the possibility to engage in tax avoidance or not. Suppose that high-wage non-avoiders 
choosing a low income have a low valuation while avoiders reporting a low income have a 
high willingness to pay due to a large hidden income, and hence prefer market purchases. 
Then it is only in the avoidance case that public provision of this good is efficiently targeted 
at the people who actually have low earnings ability. Drawing such lessons is clearly of 
relevance for policy advice. 
A further result that we highlight in our analysis is that, even when welfare-enhancing, 
public provision may induce larger evasion. The reason is that it can make working easier or 
less costly, which in turn can stimulate efforts to earn unreported income. 
To prepare the ground for our formal analysis of taxes, public provision and 
avoidance, we shall first elaborate on each of them separately, and then give an introduction 
to our general approach. 
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Our starting point is that taxation is based on the ability principle, that is, people with 
higher earnings capacity (skills) should pay more taxes than those who are less able. Modern 
tax theory (pioneered by Mirrlees, 1971) has modelled the problem involved as one of 
asymmetric information. The government does not know who are high-skilled and who are 
low-skilled. The simplest model of this kind assumes two types of individuals (see, e.g., 
Stiglitz, 1982, and Stern, 1982): high-skilled and low-skilled with the former being more 
productive and obtaining a higher wage rate than the latter. Since the government does not 
directly observe the individual characteristics, taxes or transfers cannot be conditioned on 
innate ability. The government can only design combinations of gross income and taxes, and 
hence disposable income, and let agents choose their preferred income point. To achieve 
redistribution, one tax must be lower than the other, and conceivably negative. Then a 
problem is that high-skilled agents may mimic low-skilled agents by lowering their labour 
supply to earn the income qualifying for the lower tax. The tax must then be designed in such 
a way that mimicking is deterred, otherwise no redistribution is achieved.  
           Public provision of goods and services can take different forms. One type of provision 
scheme will give everybody the amount that he or she needs. This need is well defined only if 
there is satiation in the sense that a person wants only a limited amount of the commodity. An 
example may be child care since parents will want to substitute only part of the time they can 
spend with the children by care given by other people or because provision of child care is 
confined to the number of working hours of the parents, which is indeed the Swedish scheme. 
Another set of provision schemes gives everybody a fixed amount, say a fixed amount 
of primary education, or a fixed amount of health services in case of some illness.  A crucial 
question is whether the recipient can resell the commodities. If reselling is possible, the public 
provision is tantamount to a transfer in cash as the recipients can obtain the same cash value 
by selling the commodity. One may therefore want to have public provision of commodities 
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that cannot be resold, typically services received directly by the beneficiaries, or designing the 
scheme to make reselling difficult. 
Another important question is which market opportunities the recipient has for obtaining a 
consumption bundle that is not constrained to the publicly provided amount. When market 
alternatives exist, there are two ways in which a consumer may benefit from them. In brief, 
one can purchase an amount in the market instead of or in addition to the amount that one can 
get from the government. In the former case, one will forego the public provision in order to 
get a larger quantity obtained by purchases in the market.2  One may choose a private school, 
hospital or child care centre rather than the public offer. The alternative is that it is possible to 
take the publicly provided ration and supplement it with additional purchases in the market. 
The most clear-cut example may be where the government issues a voucher giving the 
recipient a minimum amount free of charge and allowing the consumer to get a larger quantity 
by paying out of pocket for an additional amount. To distinguish the various kinds of public 
provision schemes by conceivable interactions with market supply, we will use the following 
terminology. A no upper bound system is one in which each individual gets exactly the 
desired quantity. Where the consumer is faced with a choice between either accepting public 
provision or foregoing it to rely solely on market purchases, we will refer to opting-out 
schemes.  Finally, arrangements allowing consumers to supplement public provision with 
market purchases are termed topping-up schemes.  
Without avoidance, earlier studies have shown that public provision is welfare-
enhancing only if preferences are such that there is non-separability between labor and other 
goods. When the demand for the publicly provided good is decreasing in labor supply, a high-
                                                 
2 To simplify the exposition, we will only speak about differences in quantities even though in some cases it 
might be more fitting to conceive of differences in quality. However, even quality has a quantitative dimension 
as higher quality means more of some favourable property of a commodity, e.g. more pedagogical content in an 
hour of child care.    
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skilled mimicker wants more of the commodity than a true low-skilled agent, and therefore an 
opting-out system is optimal. If instead demand is increasing in labour supply, a mimicker 
demands less than the mimicked and a topping-up or a no upper bound system is optimal. If, 
for given hours of work, there is satiation, then the no upper bound system can dominate the 
topping up system, since the former can mitigate more self-selection constraints (in models 
with more than two types of agents). 
Several approaches exist in the literature on evasion and avoidance - with evasion 
normally referring to illegal and avoidance to legal tax-escaping activities. Most of the early 
evasion literature, following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), assumes that decisions about 
underreporting income involve risk. Evasion may be detected with some probability, for 
instance due to random audits by the tax authorities, in which case a sanction applies.3         
            An alternative approach, proposed by Usher (1986) and adopted in our analysis, 
assumes a riskless setting where a certain tax saving is attainable by combining 
underreporting with a costly concealment activity. The concealment cost function may be 
implicitly assumed to capture some of the elements from the uncertainty model, for instance 
to be higher the more extensive is the auditing activity of the tax collector. As in the 
                                                 
3 In the context of the normative theory of optimal redistributive taxation, Cremer and Gahvari (1995) and 
Schroyen (1997) are the two main contributions modelling (income tax) evasion as a risky activity. As our paper, 
these contributions use a two-type model where agents are heterogeneous in terms of labor productivity. In 
contrast to our paper, where we focus on the effects of evasion for the optimal design of public provision 
schemes, their focus is on characterizing the optimal enforcement policy and the optimal progressivity of the 
nonlinear income tax. 
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uncertainty case, there is a trade-off between the gain from shrinking the tax by 
underreporting and the cost incurred, which is now modelled as a pure concealment cost.4,5 
            Compared with analyses of public provision in the no-avoidance case, the possibility 
of income misreporting implies two main consequences. First, a high-skilled mimicker and a 
low-skilled agent no longer have the same disposable income. This means that the income 
effect on the demand for the publicly provided good now comes into play. Second, it is no 
longer necessarily true that a mimicker works fewer hours than a low-skilled agent. Both 
these facts are of importance for whether the mimicker or the mimicked has the larger demand 
for the publicly provided good.  
            We obtain three main results. First, earlier studies of public provision schemes have 
shown that public provision is welfare enhancing only if preferences are such that there is 
non-separability between labor and goods. We show that income tax avoidance implies that 
non-separability between labor and other goods is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition to make public provision of private goods a welfare enhancing policy instrument. 
Second, income misreporting tends to make schemes where individuals are not allowed to top 
up the publicly provided quantity welfare-superior to schemes where topping up is allowed. 
Third, a further result that we highlight in our analysis is that public provision may be welfare 
enhancing even in cases when it leads to an increase in income misreporting.     
            Theory and empirical evidence indicate that tax avoidance/evasion opportunities 
depend on features of a country’s economic structure such as the extent to which income is 
                                                 
4 Within the literature on the normative theory of redistributive optimal taxation, previous contributions adopting 
the riskless approach include Boadway et al. (1994), Kopczuk (2001), and Gahvari and Micheletto (2014). 
Examples from other contexts are Mayshar (1991), Slemrod (2001) and Chetty (2009). 
5 Regardless of whether we have evasion or avoidance in mind, the activity is assumed to involve a (private and 
social) cost to be traded off against the tax saving. As we model them, the two activities become very similar and 
we find it convenient to use hereafter “avoidance” as a uniform term for these activities. 
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subject to information reporting from public registers and third parties (employers and even 
financial institutions), the average size of firms, the importance of self-employment, and the 
extent of public disclosure of taxable income (see, Kleven et al., 2009, Kleven et al., 2011, 
and Slemrod et al., 2013). Therefore, tax avoidance might not be very important in countries 
like the Nordic countries, and earlier analyses of public provision of private goods are 
probably relevant for these countries. Our results should instead be relevant for 
non‐developed countries,6 where tax avoidance/evasion problems often are big, as well as for 
those developed countries where avoidance/evasion is a widespread phenomenon.7 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a simple two-type optimal 
tax model is set up to show that, when agents have access to an avoidance technology, the 
case for supplementing the nonlinear income tax with topping-up public provision schemes is 
somewhat weakened and the case for an opting-out scheme strengthened. Section 3 
investigates the effects of public provision on avoidance. Section 4 discusses how the results 
generalize to a setting where agents differ both in terms of market productivity and 
concealment costs. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
The economy has two types of agent distinguished by their innate earnings ability (output per 
unit of work effort), which is reflected in the wage rate. The wage rate of an agent of type k 
                                                 
6 It is true that many of these countries do not yet have a well‐working income tax system and therefore rely on 
various inefficient sources of revenue (see, e.g., Gordon and Li, 2009). However, it is also plausible that some of 
these countries will in due time develop welfare systems of the Western type. 
7 For instance, according to the data for selected OECD countries in 2000 in Parker (2009), the self-employment 
rate was about 25% in Italy, and empirical evidence for this country finds estimates of the rate of under-reporting 
of self-employment income in the range of around 30%-55%; an estimate for Greece reports a shortfall in tax 
receipts, due to tax evasion, of nearly 30%. For further details on these countries, see Fiorio and D’Amuri 
(2005), Marino and Zizza (2012), De Gregorio and Giordano (2014), and Matsaganis et al. (2012). 
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(k=1,2) is denoted kw , with 2 1w w . Thus, agents of type 1 are low-skilled and agents of 
type 2 are high-skilled. The total population is normalized to unity and k  represents the 
proportion of agents of type k. Two goods (X₁ and X2) are produced by a linear technology 
using labor as the only input;8 the producer price of good X₁	is denoted by p and that of good  
X2	 is normalized to 1. Preferences are represented by the quasi-concave utility function 
 1 2, ,u x x h , where ix  denotes the consumption of commodity i and h denotes labor supply. 
All goods (including leisure) are assumed to be normal throughout the analysis.  
    The government aims at redistributing from those who are better-off in the laissez-
faire equilibrium to those who are worse-off. The informational structure of the problem is the 
following. The government knows the distribution of types in the population, but it does not 
know the identity of the types. Therefore, type-specific lump-sum taxes are ruled out by 
assumption. The usual asymmetric information assumption is that the government can 
observe gross income, wh , but it cannot observe separately w and h. In our model, however, 
not even earned income is observable as we allow for the possibility of tax avoidance. The 
government has to rely on reported income, denoted by M, and has at its disposal a general 
income tax T(M). 
To model income-misreporting, we follow the riskless approach outlined in the 
introduction. Misreporting is denoted by a and defined as a≡wh-M. In principle, both under-
reporting ( 0a  ) and over-reporting ( 0a  ) are conceivable depending on the shape of the 
tax schedule.9 The cost of misreporting is expressed by means of the function g(a), which is 
assumed to be non-negative, increasing in the absolute value of a and strictly convex; we also 
assume that g(0)=g′(0)=0. We will refer to g(a) as the concealment cost.  
                                                 
8 The assumption of two commodities is made to keep notation simple. The model can easily be generalized to 
more than two commodities. 
9 Over-reporting is an optimal strategy when an agent faces a negative marginal income tax rate. 
9 
 
 Even though we adopt the riskless approach it is important to emphasize that the 
qualitative results that we obtain regarding the optimal design of public provision schemes 
can be generalized to the case where income misreporting is a risky activity. The reasons for 
this are discussed at the end of Section 2. 
 
A pure income tax optimum  
Since there are only two types in our model, only two points on the optimal tax schedule are 
of interest. Denoting reported (taxable) income by M and after tax (reported) income by B 
(with B being defined as the difference between M and the corresponding tax payment T(M)), 
the problem for the policy maker is therefore to design one point 1 1,M B  intended for the low-
skilled type and another point 2 2,M B  intended for the high-skilled. Since individuals are free 
to choose the point they prefer, these must be designed by the policy maker subject to a 
budget constraint and a self-selection constraint to be described below. 
The government’s problem is to design a Pareto-efficient tax schedule, which can be 
derived by maximising the utility of a given type of agent, subject to the other type's utility 
being fixed at a pre-set level, and subject to self-selection and revenue constraints. The self-
selection constraints arise since the government must design the tax system so that each 
ability type (weakly) prefers the (M,B)-bundle intended for him to that intended for the other 
type. An agent that misrepresents his type is called a mimicker.  
    Before formalizing the government's problem, we address the optimization problem 
solved by the agents. It is helpful to divide this problem into two stages. In the first stage, for 
given values of M and B, the agent chooses his labor supply and consumption of the two 
goods. This gives a conditional labor supply function and conditional demand functions for 1x  
and 2x . The budget available for purchasing the two commodities is the true labour earnings 
(wh) minus the tax based on reported income (T=M-B) and minus the concealment cost 
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(g(a)).  Formally, the individual optimization problem (suppressing type superscript) in the 
first stage is: 
                           
1 2
1 2, ,
max , ,
x x h
u x x h  s.t.  1 2px x wh M B g wh M      , 
for which the following first order conditions are obtained: 
                                                      
1 2
/u u p
x x
            
,                                   (1)                                                  
                                     
2
/ 1 'u u g wh M w
h x
               
.                        (2)                                                  
Denoting by V(M, B;w) the maximum value function of the problem above, in the 
second stage the agent determines how much income to report, i.e. he chooses his preferred 
(M,B)-bundle, subject to the link between M and B implied by the income tax schedule: B=M-
T(M). This allows us to implicitly define the marginal income tax faced by an agent as: 
                                     /' 1 1
/
V MT M MRS
V B
      ,                                      (3)                        
where MRS  denotes the marginal rate of substitution between M  and B .  
 
 Notice also that, by invoking the envelope theorem, we have 
   2/ 1 ' /V M g a u x        and 2/ /V B u x     . Therefore, we also have: 
                                                        /1 '
/
V M g a
V B
    ,                                                  (4)                               
implying: 
 
                                                             ' 'T M g a .10                                                    (5)                              
 
          Using  ,kV M B  to denote  , ; kV M B w , the government’s problem can be formally  
 
                                                 
10 Both (4) and (5) crucially hinge on our assumptions about the cost of avoidance function, and in particular on 
the assumption that    0 ' 0 0g g  . 
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stated as: 
   
                                                               1 1 2 2 1 1 1, , ,max ,M B M B V M B  
s.t.: 
                                             2 2 2 2,V M B V                           
                                               2 2 2 2 1 1, ,V M B V M B          ( ) 
                                             2
1
k k k
k
M B R

  ,                 ( ) 
where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, the first constraint requires a minimum 
utility for the high-skilled agents, the second is the self-selection constraint preventing high-
skilled agents from mimicking the low-skilled agents, and the last constraint is the 
government's budget constraint, with R being an exogenous revenue requirement.11 
Using a “hat” to denote a variable pertaining to a mimicker, the definition 
 ' 1T M MRS   and *  as shorthand for  1 1( / ) /V B   , standard manipulations of the 
first order conditions of the government's problem allow deriving the following results: 
  2 22 22 2/' 1 1 0/V MT M MRSV B             (6) 
    1 1 1 1 11 11 1 1 11/ / / ˆ' 1 * */ //V M V M V MT M MRS MRSV B V BV B                     (7) 
Equation (6) implies the standard result that the marginal tax rate faced by the high-
skilled agents is equal to zero. By (5) this also means that g′(a²)=0, and accordingly a²=0. 
Thus, the high-skilled agents truthfully report their earned income.12 
                                                 
11 The self-selection constraint requiring that type 1 does not mimic type 2 can be safely neglected due to our 
assumption that the government redistributes from the high-skilled to the low-skilled agents. 
12 This result deserves some comments since its relevance might easily be misperceived. The result descends 
from the fact that it is optimal not to distort the bundle offered to the most skilled agents, since nobody is 
tempted to mimic them. Since in our simple setting we have only two types of agent, we also get that high-
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The term within parentheses on the right hand side of (7) measures the difference 
between the marginal rate of substitution between M and B for a low-skilled agent and a high-
skilled mimicker, at the (M,B)-bundle intended for the low-skilled agents. In standard optimal 
tax models without tax avoidance, a monotonicity property (single-crossing condition) 
guarantees that, at any bundle in the (earned income, net-of-tax income)-space, the 
indifference curve of a high-skilled mimicker is flatter than the corresponding curve for a true 
low-skilled agent.13 The intuition for the result is that an agent with lower skill needs to 
supply more labor both to achieve the initial level of earnings and in order to increase his 
gross earnings by one unit, and therefore he requires a larger compensation in terms of net-of-
tax income. In our model with tax avoidance, agents choose among bundles in the (reported 
income, net-of-tax reported income)-space, and reported income may differ from true earned 
income. Nonetheless, the same type of monotonicity property that applies in standard optimal 
tax models also applies in our model with tax avoidance. To show this, we first need to 
establish the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. 
A high-skilled mimicker under-reports more (or over-reports less) income than a low-skilled 
agent: 1aˆ a . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
skilled agents truthfully report their earned income. However, in a richer setting with several types of agents, or 
in a model with a continuum of types, the no-distortion and no-avoidance result would only apply to a tiny 
fraction of the population. Its role would then appear more modest than in the two type model where all high-
skilled individuals are by assumption at the very top of the skill distribution. 
13 Non-inferiority of consumption is a sufficient condition for this result. 
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Armed with Lemma 1, the following Corollary shows that the agent monotonicity condition is 
preserved in our model with tax avoidance. 
 
Corollary 1. 
The agent monotonicity condition holds even in the presence of tax avoidance. 
PROOF: Rewriting (4) as  / 1 '
/
V M g a
V B
     , we have: 
 / ''
/
dB V M ag a
w dM w V B w
               .                                                             (8) 
Due to the convexity of  g a ,  '' 0g a  ; moreover, from Lemma 1 we have that 1aˆ a , 
implying / 0a w   .  Therefore, for any given (M,B)-bundle, the right hand side of (8) takes 
a negative sign as required by the agent monotonicity condition. 
 
We can now go back to eq. (7) which expresses the optimal marginal tax rate faced by 
the low-skilled agents. Given that in (7) the sign of the difference within parentheses is 
positive by the agent monotonicity assumption, we can conclude that the low-skilled agents 
face a positive marginal tax rate at an optimum. This also implies that  1' 0g a  , i.e. 1 0a  . 
Thus, at a pure income tax optimum the low-skilled agents will under-report their income.   
Another corollary of Lemma 1 which will be important in our subsequent analysis is 
the following. 
 
Corollary 2. 
Allowing for the possibility of tax avoidance implies that the disposable income of a high-
skilled mimicker exceeds that of a low-skilled agent. 
PROOF: Denoting disposable income  B a g a   by Z , we have that 
/ 1 '( ) 0dZ da g a   . The inequality follows from the fact that  'g a  is equal to the 
marginal tax rate that is always less than one. Since 1B B and 1aˆ a , it follows that  1Z Z .  
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Finally, the possibility to engage in tax avoidance implies that it is no longer possible 
to unambiguously rank the labor supply of a high-skilled mimicker and of a low-skilled agent. 
This result is expressed in Lemma 2, which will also be important in our subsequent analysis, 
and which stands in contrast with the result obtained in models without tax avoidance where 
the labor supply of a high-skilled mimicker is necessarily lower than that of a low-skilled 
agent. 
 
Lemma 2. 
With tax avoidance the labor supply of a high-skilled mimicker might be larger than the labor 
supply of a low-skilled agent. 
Proof: At any given (M,B)-bundle an agent's problem is:  
1 2
1 2, ,
max , ,
x x h
u x x h  subject to 
 1 2px x wh M B g wh M      , which is a utility maximization problem subject to a 
nonlinear budget constraint. Linearizing the budget constraint we can define the local 
(marginal) price of leisure as   1 'w g a w   . An increase in w exerts both an income and 
a substitution effect. The income effect on labor supply is unambiguously negative assuming 
leisure is normal. The substitution effect depends on the change in the marginal wage rate, i.e. 
the sign of    / 1 ' ''w w g a whg a     . With  1 ' 0g a   and  '' 0g a  , the 
substitution effect can be either positive or negative. Where it is negative, both income and 
substitution effects on labor supply are negative. However, if the substitution effect is 
positive, whether the labor supply increases or diminishes depends on the relative magnitude 
of the two conflicting effects. If the substitution effect is positive and it dominates the income 
effect, the labor supply of a high-skilled mimicker will exceed the labor supply of a low-
skilled agent:  , ; / 0dh M B w dw  . 
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Supplementing the income tax with public provision of private goods 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are three types of public provision schemes. One is 
the topping-up system; a fixed quantity is provided to each agent and the agents can top up by 
buying additional amounts in the market if they find the ration too low. A second is the 
opting-out system; a fixed quantity is provided to everyone, and agents cannot top up. If they 
do not like the publicly provided quantity they can opt out and buy the desired quantity in the 
market instead. In that case, however, they completely forego the publicly provided quantity. 
A third form is the no upper bound system; in this system each agent gets exactly the desired 
quantity. This system is only viable if, for given hours of work, there is satiation. In other 
words, the consumer’s need for the good is strictly determined by labour supply.  
Let us briefly describe how public provision of a private good can mitigate the self-
selection constraint in the optimal taxation problem where there are no opportunities for tax 
avoidance. (Note that when there are no opportunities for tax avoidance M wh  and the 
disposable income is given by B .)  We do this for the case where the demand for the publicly 
provided good is increasing in hours of work and a topping up system is used. The general 
idea is similar for the other types of public provision schemes. The maximization problem 
 
1 2
1 2,
max , ,
x x
u x x h  s.t. 1 2px x B   yields the demand functions  1 ,x B h  and  2 ,x B h . 
Consider the optimal taxation problem with a binding self-selection constraint requiring high-
skilled agents not to mimic low-skilled agents. Let  1 1 1 11 1 , /x x B Y w ,  1 1 21 1ˆ , /x x B Y w  
and  2 2 2 21 1 , /x x B Y w , where we let  Y wh  denote labor income. Since 2 1w w  it 
follows that 11 1ˆx x . Since 2 1B B  and  2 1Y Y  it follows that 21 1ˆ.x x 14 Set the public 
provision level to  1 21 1 1min ,x x x  and decrease the disposable incomes B1 and B2 by the 
                                                 
14  Because of the binding self-selection constraint the points Y1,B1 and Y2,B2 are on the same indifference curve 
for a high-skilled agent, but Y2,B2 are to the north-east of Y1,B1, it follows that 2 1Y Y  and 2 1B B . 
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market value of the public provision. Then the person with the higher demand can top up, 
meaning that both persons will have the same undistorted consumption bundles as before. 
However, due to the no reselling constraint, a mimicker is forced to over-consume the 
publicly provided good and under-consume the other good,15 implying that his utility 
decreases; the self-selection constraint slackens and we can increase the before and after tax 
income of type one to a less distorted point. A strict Pareto improvement obtains.16 
Disregarding the possibility of tax evasion/avoidance, earlier contributions have 
characterized the conditions under which each of the three systems is optimal (see e.g., 
Blomquist and Christiansen 1995, 1998 and Blomquist et al. 2010). For later purposes, we 
summarize these earlier results in a proposition that rephrases them so they are valid both for 
the case without and the case with income misreporting.  
Proposition 1.  
If, at a given taxable income, the high-skilled mimicker demands more of the commodity than 
the low-skilled being mimicked, then an opting-out system is optimal. If there is no satiation 
and the mimicker demands less than the mimicked, then a topping-up system is optimal. If, for 
given hours of work, there is satiation and the mimicker demands less than the mimicked, then 
a no upper bound system is optimal. This characterization holds true whether there are 
opportunities for tax evasion/avoidance or not.  
 
         When there are no possibilities for tax evasion/avoidance this characterization can be 
rephrased in terms of properties of the demand function  ,x B h . In the standard optimal tax 
model the mimicker and the mimicked have the same disposable income 1B  and the mimicker 
                                                 
15 By under-consumption (over-consumption) we refer to a situation where the marginal valuation of the good 
exceeds (falls short of) its price.  
16 See Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) for a more formal analysis. 
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works less, 1hˆ h . Therefore, if / 0x h   , the mimicker wants more of the commodity than 
the person he mimics and an opting-out system is optimal. If instead / 0x h   , the mimicker 
demands less than the mimicked and a topping-up or a no upper bound system is optimal. If, 
for given hours of work, there is satiation, then the no upper bound system can dominate the 
topping up system, since the former can mitigate more self-selection constraints.  
When the agents can avoid taxes there are two major changes to the characterization in 
the preceding paragraph. First, as shown in corollary 2, the mimicker and the mimicked no 
longer have the same disposable income. This means that the income effect on the demand for 
the publicly provided good now comes into play. Second, in the standard model without tax 
avoidance the mimicker works fewer hours than the low skilled agent. As shown in Lemma 2, 
with tax avoidance the mimicker can work more hours than the low skilled agent. Both these 
facts are of importance for whether the mimicker or the mimicked has the larger demand for 
the publicly provided good.  
Let us now elaborate on the relations between commodity demand and the wage rate, 
i.e, /dx dw , when there are possibilities to avoid tax. To give a characterization of the 
conditions under which /dx dw  is positive/negative, and the various public provision schemes 
are warranted when there is a tax avoidance technology available, it is useful to note that the 
first order condition (1) and the budget constraint Z=px1+x2 implicitly define demands for X₁ 
and X2 as functions of disposable income   Z B wh M g wh M       and labour supply 
h. We express the demand for X₁ as  1 ,x Z h . Next we take into account that h is a function 
of the wage rate due to condition (2), as discussed above. Denote by ,h w  the elasticity of 
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labor supply with respect to the wage rate (i.e.   , / /h w w h dh dw  ).17 Differentiating with 
respect to the wage rate, gives: 
                                    1 1 1,, 1 ' 1 h wdx Z h x x dhg a hdw Z h dw       .              (9)                                                 
Since   1 'g a  and  ,1 h w  are both positive, the first term on the right hand side 
is positive if X₁ is a normal good. The second term is positive if 1 /x h   and /dh dw  have the 
same sign, otherwise it is negative. Assuming X₁ not to be inferior, a necessary condition for 
1 /dx dw  to be negative is therefore that 1 /x h   and /dh dw  are of opposite signs. A negative 
sign for 1 /dx dw  could occur if, for example, the income effect on the demand for X₁ is small, 
X₁ is strongly complementary with h and hours of work are decreasing in the wage rate 
(reflecting a small and conceivably negative substitution effect and a strong income effect on 
labor supply).  Based on (9) and proposition 1 we can state the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. 
a If there is nonsatiation, the good is noninferior, 1 /x h   and /dh dw  are nonzero and have 
the same sign, or the good is normal and 1 / 0x h   , then 1 /dx dw  is positive. A topping up 
system cannot mitigate the self-selection constraint but an opting out system can and is the 
optimal choice of public provision scheme.   
 
b If there is nonsatiation, the good is normal, 1 /x h   and /dh dw are nonzero and of 
opposite signs, then 1 /dx dw  is in general indeterminate, and what is the proper public 
provision scheme depends on which one of the two terms in eq. (9) is larger in absolute terms. 
                                                 
17 Notice that , 1h w   . This is because, as we have shown in Lemma 1, da/dw>0 which implies 
  / 0d wh dw  . 
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c If there is nonsatiation, the income effect on the demand for X₁ is zero, and 1 /x h   and 
/dh dw are nonzero and of opposite signs, then 1 /dx dwis negative and a topping up system is 
optimal.  
 
d If there is satiation, the income effect on the demand for X₁ is zero, and 1 /x h   and 
/dh dw are nonzero and of opposite signs, then 1 /dx dw  is negative and a no upper bound 
system is optimal.  
 
Proof: The results follow directly from Proposition 1 and eq. (9).  
 
The information requirement is largest in case b, since we need to know which one of the two 
terms that dominates. In all other cases only knowledge of signs is needed to determine what 
kind of public provision scheme that is optimal.  
It can be worth to comment further on the two special cases where the demand only 
depends on a single argument, i.e. when either 1 / 0x h    or 1 / 0x Z   . The case 
1 / 0x h    occurs when agents' preferences are weakly separable between leisure and other 
goods. Where the good is normal and demand only depends on disposable income, /dx dw  
will be positive and a mimicker will have a larger consumption. In this case a topping-up 
provision scheme, or a no-upper-bound scheme, cannot improve upon a pure income tax 
optimum. The self-selection constraint cannot be relaxed since the mimicker can undo any 
rationing of the publicly provided good by topping up. However, supplementing the income 
tax with an opting-out provision scheme will be welfare-improving. 
  The income effect is zero when  1 2 1, , / 0u x x h x    and 
   2 1x wh M B g wh M px h      . The interpretation is that no direct benefit is derived 
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from good X₁ which is instead a necessary “intermediate good” required for working, say 
child care needed by working parents. The fact that the demand for X₁ does not depend on 
disposable income removes one channel by which tax avoidance contributes to raise the 
mimicker's demand beyond that of a low-skilled agent. This suggests that tax avoidance in 
this case is less likely to reverse the order between the amount demanded by a mimicker and 
the one demanded by a true low-skilled. Thus, for a purely labor-related good a topping-up 
provision, or a no-upper-bound scheme, still stands a good chance of being a welfare-
enhancing device through its effect on the self-selection constraint.  
    Three insights from the above analysis are central. First, unlike in the conventional 
(no-avoidance) case, differential treatment of the mimicker and the true low-skilled may be 
possible and there may be a case for public provision even where labour is (weakly) separable 
from other goods in the agents’ utility function.18 This is because when there is tax avoidance 
the mimicker and the mimicked will have different disposable incomes. Second, the case for a 
topping-up public provision scheme or a no-upper-bound scheme is weakened by tax 
avoidance when the publicly provided good is a normal good. Third, tax avoidance may 
require using an opting-out scheme where a topping-up scheme or a no-upper-bound scheme 
would otherwise be desirable. Thus, tax avoidance can make a substantial difference for the 
desirability and optimal design of a public provision scheme. 
               A last point that we would like to briefly discuss regards the importance of 
modelling income misreporting as a riskless (but costly) activity or as a risky activity which 
may be detected through costly audits and punished along a penalty function. As mentioned in 
                                                 
18 This result relates to the Boadway et al.’s (1994) finding that the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem no 
longer holds when income taxes are vulnerable to evasion. In particular, as shown by Boadway et al. (1994), the 
possibility of income misreporting implies that, even in the presence of a nonlinear income tax, proportional 
commodity taxes are no longer a redundant policy instrument when labour is (weakly) separable from other 
goods in the agents’ utility function. 
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the Introduction, the latter approach was used by Cremer and Gahvari (1995) and Schroyen 
(1997). As in our model, these papers adopt a two-type version of the optimal tax model. In 
Schroyen’s model workers may work in the official market paying taxes, but may also 
allocate labour to an irregular market where earnings go unreported. Cremer and Gahvari 
assume that agents can simply misreport income earned in a single labour market. The two 
papers derive very similar results. Modelling evasion as a risky activity, the focus of these 
papers is very much on auditing and penalties. These phenomena are obviously absent in our 
riskless model. Our primary purpose is not to contribute to the theory of tax avoidance, but 
rather to examine conceivable consequences of tax avoidance for the optimal use of public 
provision schemes to alleviate tax distortions. To encompass this additional instrument, we 
have chosen a more tractable way to model avoidance. However, the two approaches share 
many results, most easily seen by considering marginal taxes. In either set of models high-
wage persons optimally face a zero marginal tax (are undistorted); where the standard self-
selection is binding, the low-skilled type faces a positive marginal tax. 
                      Most importantly, for the qualitative results on public provision that we have 
described above, it makes no important difference whether one models income misreporting 
as a riskless (but costly) activity or as a risky activity. The main difference is that in the latter 
case, allowing for a nonlinear penalty policy, no agent is misreporting income at an 
equilibrium optimum (see, e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 1995). This is obtained by designing the 
optimal income tax subject to a set of three moral hazard constraints. The first two require that 
both the low-skilled agents and the high-skilled agents are at least as well off by earning and 
reporting the income intended by the planner for them rather than reporting the income 
intended for them by the planner but at the same time engaging in tax evasion. The last moral 
hazard constraint requires that high-skilled agents are at least as well off by earning and 
reporting the income intended by the planner for them rather than reporting the income 
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intended for the low-skilled and at the same time engaging in tax evasion. As shown by 
Cremer and Gahvari (1995), at least one of the three moral hazard constraints is binding at an 
optimum. High-wage persons optimally face a zero marginal tax (are undistorted), as in our 
model. High-wage reports are never audited.  Low- wage reports face random audits and may 
be fined, imposing a cost of avoidance. Where the standard self-selection is binding the low-
skilled type faces a positive marginal tax, as in our model.  Moreover, as in the self-selection 
constraint focused on in our model, at each of the moral hazard constraints the deviating agent 
has a larger disposable income than the agent he pretends to be for tax purposes. Also, as in 
our model, the labor supply of a deviating agent can be either larger or smaller than that of the 
agent he pretends to be for tax purposes. In particular, the labor supply of a deviating agent 
will be larger at the first two moral hazard constraints described above (since the deviating 
and the mimicked agents have the same skill but the former evades while the latter doesn’t), 
whereas it may be either larger or smaller at the third moral hazard constraint described above 
(since the deviating agent is a high-skilled whereas the mimicked is a low-skilled). 
 
III. AVOIDANCE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PROVISION SCHEMES 
The distortion introduced by the positive marginal tax on type-1 agents in the optimal taxation 
solution implies that they both avoid taxes and work too little. Since we study a public 
provision scheme which is Pareto-improving, and in that sense makes the allocation less 
distorted, it may be tempting to believe that both distortions are mitigated and that tax 
avoidance unambiguously decreases when the nonlinear income tax is supplemented with 
public provision. However, this is not always true. In this section we shed light on this issue 
by considering two different public provision schemes.  
The simplest case to consider is the no upper bound system. Blomquist et al. (2010) 
analyse this system in detail and show that, under this provision scheme, the cost of providing 
the public good should be mirrored in the marginal tax. For the high-skilled type the marginal 
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tax is zero at the pure tax optimum. Thus, when the public provision scheme is introduced, the 
marginal tax increases from zero to a positive number and tax avoidance unequivocally 
increases. This follows from the condition that at a utility maximum the marginal 
concealment cost associated with tax avoidance should be equal to the marginal tax (see eq. 
(5)). For the low-skilled type there are two influences on the marginal tax; it rises because the 
cost of the publicly provided good is mirrored in the marginal tax, while a second influence is 
that the distortionary part of the marginal tax decreases. The net effect on the marginal tax is 
ambiguous, and hence the impact on tax avoidance for the low-skilled type is ambiguous too.  
Now consider a topping-up scheme and assume that, as in Section 2, the government’s 
problem is to maximize the utility of low-skilled agents subject to a self-selection constraint, a 
public budget constraint and a constraint specifying a pre-set utility level for high-skilled 
agents. As above, the avoidance level is positively associated with the marginal tax rate 
(through eq. (5)). The crucial question is then how the marginal tax rate, as implicitly defined 
by eq. (3), is affected by the public provision. We first note that for an agent topping up, the 
public provision is just like a lump sum gift, and the relevant disposable income will now 
include the market value of the transfer in kind, and be defined as 1B B px  . As long as an 
agent tops up we can express the indirect utility function as ( ,B)V M  , and the indifference 
map associated with this function will be identical to the one associated with the indirect 
utility function  ,V M B  in the pure tax optimum. However, this will no longer be the case 
where agents are no-reselling constrained and forced to overconsume commodity 1, even 
though eq. (3) still applies. When the publicly provided good is complementary to labor 
supply, the agents will accept a smaller compensation in terms of disposable income to be 
willing to increase their labor supply. This means that, for a given value of B , the 
indifference curves get flatter, implying a larger marginal tax rate according to eq. (3).  It is 
conceivable that this effect will be the prevailing one even when public provision enables the 
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government to increase the utility of low-skilled agents by offering them a bundle with higher 
B  and M. Then the effect of public provision is to enhance the amount of income concealed 
by the low-skilled agents.19       
The important lesson that can be drawn from the analysis of this Section is that, from a 
welfarist standpoint, it would be misleading to gauge the desirability of public provision 
based on its effect on tax avoidance. The key aspect is whether or not mimicking can be made 
less attractive by using a public provision scheme. If this is the case, public provision 
represents a Pareto-improving device even though it may lead to an increase in the level of tax 
avoidance.20 
 
IV. HETEROGENEOUS CONCEALMENT COSTS 
Assuming that everybody has the same avoidance technology is clearly restrictive. However, 
a full-fledged discussion of the case where agents with the same skill in the labour market 
may have different avoidance technology, and, accordingly, different concealment cost, 
                                                 
19 The analytical details are provided in the Appendix. Notice also that, in a two-type model with redistribution 
from the high- to the low-skilled agents, the high-skilled agents face a zero marginal tax rate both under a pure 
income tax optimum and under an optimum where the income tax is supplemented with a topping-up provision 
scheme. Thus, in both cases they truthfully report their income to the tax authority. For this reason, we can 
confine our attention to the effects of public provision on the avoidance choice of the low-skilled agents.    
20 This result is different than Kopczuk’s (2001) finding that avoidance may be welfare-improving because it 
may serve as a cheaper, though still wasteful, instrument of redistribution. Kopczuk’s finding is based on a 
model where the government can affect how easy is for people to misreport earned income for tax purposes and 
where private agents differ both in terms of labor productivity and either opportunities for evasion or attitudes 
towards paying taxes. His result highlights the fact that avoidance may serve to redistribute income even though 
further redistribution by standard (tax) instruments is inefficient due to incentive constraints. Our result, instead, 
points to the fact that supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with other standard policy instruments 
may be welfare-enhancing even in cases when, by doing so, the overall level of income tax evasion is driven up.       
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would require an extensive analysis. As a compromise, we shall only briefly consider some 
features of the heterogeneous case. Expressing the concealment cost as ( )g a , the difference 
can be modelled as different values of  , say 1  versus 1  , where the latter reflects the 
more efficient concealment technology. A stricter distinction would be to assume that one 
type cannot at all avoid (having prohibitively large concealment cost) and are non-avoiders, 
while the other type can, and are avoiders. As either alternative will convey the same basic 
insights we will for simplicity refer to avoiders and non-avoiders without necessarily having 
in mind the stricter case. 
              Assume first that only high-skilled people have different concealment costs. In the 
M,B-space they will have indifference curves that have slope one and coincide at a point 
where no avoidance takes place (the marginal tax is zero). For all other M,B-combinations the 
indifference curve of the avoider will be located beneath that of the non-avoider as a lower 
formal after-tax income B is needed to achieve the same utility level since the avoider also has 
some unreported income. Hence the point where the curves coincide is a tangency point. In 
the laissez-faire market allocation, low-skilled agents are worse off, the usual case for 
transfers is valid, and a self-selection constraint must hold. The standard no distortion at the 
top implies that both high-skilled types are undistorted, not avoiding and equally well off. To 
deter mimicking, the high-skilled avoider must be no worse off than if mimicking the low-
skilled. The high-skilled non-evader would then be strictly worse off mimicking, as, having 
no unreported income, he would be even worse off than the mimicking avoider. For simplicity 
assuming that the low-skilled is an avoider we have exactly the same kind of self-selection 
constraint as in the homogenous case above and the same discussion will be relevant. 
Now consider a setting with an avoiding high-skilled type, an avoiding low-skilled 
type and a non-avoiding low-skilled type. Since inability to avoid makes an agent worse off 
there would be a case for a transfer from the avoiding to the non-avoiding low-skilled type. 
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However, we can show that only pooling of the two types is feasible. To show that, we start 
out by assuming there is a separating allocation. Denote by ( ,n nM B ) and ( ,a aM B ) the 
income bundles of the non-avoider and the avoider, respectively. The transfer to the non-
avoider implies that his tax payment is smaller, i.e. n n nM B T   a a aT M B  .  With 
obvious meaning, we briefly refer to the respective types as a and n, respectively. Now 
consider a’s indifference curve through ( ,a aM B ) and imagine a movement along this 
indifference curve towards the M,B-line, called  , where nM B T  , and where the bundle 
( ,n nM B ) must be located.  This will obviously be a movement to the left since n aT T . The 
bundle ( ,n nM B ) must then be located (weakly) below the point of intersection between   
and a’s indifference curve through ( ,a aM B ) since by assumption the latter bundle is 
preferred to ( ,n nM B ) by a. Type n’s indifference curve through ( ,a aM B ) is flatter than that 
of a and hence will be located above the latter when moving to the left from ( ,a aM B ). This 
means that the point of intersection just discussed will be located strictly below n’s 
indifference curve through ( ,a aM B ) and therefore n will prefer ( ,a aM B ). It follows that a 
separating allocation is not feasible. There will be pooling of a and n.  
Let us just confine attention to a topping up public provision scheme of a good that is 
complementary to labour. It is easy to realise that this would favour the low-skilled avoiders 
more than the low-skilled non-avoiders since they are pooled together, but the avoiders supply 
more labour. This feature of the public provision scheme is unattractive. To assess the effect 
of the provision scheme on the self-selection constraint, two cases need to be distinguished. 
Where the high-skilled agents do not have avoidance opportunities, the provision scheme 
softens the self-selection constraint. This occurs because a mimicker is forced to pay for more 
than the publicly provided good that he consumes. However, where the high-skilled agents 
have avoidance opportunities, it is conceivable that the ability of this type of provision 
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scheme to relax the self-selection constraint is being eroded since high-skilled mimickers may 
not be working less than the low-skilled agents. Indeed, if they work strictly longer hours, this 
particular public provision scheme will tighten rather than soften the self-selection constraint 
with detrimental effects on welfare. 
  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have investigated how tax avoidance affects the desirability to use public 
provision of private goods as a redistributive device in optimal nonlinear income tax models. 
  A first result of our analysis is that income tax avoidance implies that non-
separability between labor and other goods is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
make public provision of private goods a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. In particular, 
an opting-out provision scheme can be welfare-enhancing, if the publicly provided good is a 
normal good, even when preferences are separable between labor and other goods. 
 A second result is that income misreporting tends to make opting-out provision 
schemes welfare-superior to topping-up schemes. Given that the empirical evidence indicates 
that tax dodging opportunities depend on features of a country’s economic structure such as 
the extent to which earned income is subject to information reporting from third parties and 
the average size of firms (see, e.g., Kleven et al. (2009) and Kleven et al. (2011)), a potential 
policy implication of our analysis is that topping-up public provision schemes have a better 
chance of being welfare-enhancing in countries where the share of self-employed is relatively 
small and the average size of firms is relatively big. 
Finally, we have investigated how public provision interacts with the agents’ 
incentives to misreport income and we have emphasized that public provision may be 
welfare-enhancing even in cases when it leads to an increase in income misreporting. 
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A last point which is worth mentioning is that the circumstances that the disposable 
income of a mimicker is larger than that of the agent being mimicked and that his labor supply 
may exceed that of the agent being mimicked have not only important implications for the 
optimal design of public provision schemes but also for the design of an optimal commodity 
tax structure. In fact, one of the main results of the literature on optimal commodity taxation 
in the presence of a nonlinear income tax is that, for mimicking-deterring reasons, the goods 
that are complements with leisure ought to be taxed relatively more than the goods that are 
complements with labor.21 This is because a mimicker, working less than the type that he 
mimics, tends to spend more on goods which are complements with leisure. However, when 
labor income cannot be perfectly and costlessly monitored by the tax authority, abiding by 
this rule is no longer necessarily optimal.        
 
APPENDIX  
Proof of Lemma 1 
Consider the problem of a k-type individual choosing 1
kx  and 2
kx  to maximize 
  1 2, , /k k k ku x x M a w  subject to the budget constraint  1 2k k kpx x B a g a     and 
conditional on a given value for a . This optimization problem yields  , , ;k k k ki ix x B M w a  
with i=1,2. This allows, through the composite commodity theorem, to define a conditional 
utility function in the (B,M)-space:  
                            1 2, , ; , , ; , , , ; , /k k k k k k k k kv B M w a u x B M w a x B M w a M a w  . 
Next define the (conditional) marginal rate of substitution between net-of-tax reported income 
and before-tax reported income for an agent of type k as: 
                                                 
21 For a recent example of this kind of result, see Kaplow (2010). 
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Observe that normality of 1x  and 2x  also implies normality of B
k which in turn implies that 
 , , ;k k kBMMRS B M w a  is increasing in a. This happens both because an increase in a, for 
given Mk and kw , implies a higher labor supply, and because it implies a larger disposable 
income  kB a g a  . Finally, from (2),    , , ; 1 'k k kBMMRS B M w a g a  . Hence, a low-
skilled agent, when faced with  1 1,B M , chooses a to satisfy 
                                    1 1 1, , ; 1 'BMMRS B M w a g a  .                    (a1)                                                           
On the other hand, a high-skilled mimicker chooses a such that 
                               1 1 2, , ; 1 'BMMRS B M w a g a  .                                 (a2) 
Denote the solution to (a1) by 1a  and the solution to (a2) by aˆ . It follows from (a1)-(a2) that 
                    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ˆ ˆ, , ; ' , , ; 'BM BMMRS B M w a g a MRS B M w a g a   .                     (a3)          
At the same time we also have that, for a given value of a, 
   1 1 1 1 1 2, , ; , , ;BM BMMRS B M w a MRS B M w a ; or, choosing a= 1a , 
                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , ; ' , , ; 'BM BMMRS B M w a g a MRS B M w a g a   .                (a4)         
             
Substituting from (a3) for the left hand side of (a4), 
       1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1ˆ ˆ, , ; ' , , ; 'BM BMMRS B M w a g a MRS B M w a g a   . 
Now, with  , , ;k k kBMMRS B M w a  increasing in a as shown earlier, and  'g a  increasing in a 
due to convexity of ( )g a , it follows from the above inequality that 1aˆ a . 
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Consider first the topping-up regime where only type-1 agents top up whereas type-2 agents 
are no-reselling constrained so that their consumption bundle is distorted as a result of the 
transfer in kind. To offset this inefficiency and keep type-2 agents at the pre-set utility level, 
their net-of-transfer tax burden must be lowered and, accordingly, that on type-1 agents will 
have to be increased (relative to the levels prevailing at a pure income tax optimum). 
Considering the changes 1dB  and 1dM , a larger net-of-transfer tax burden on type-1 agents 
means:  
                                                    1 1 0dM dB  .  (a5)                                                            
As we are interested in the case where public provision is desirable because it makes type-1 
agents better off, we have for these increments that  
                                        
1
1 1 1 1
1 0
M
B
B
VdV V dB dM
V
       
 ,     (a6) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. This is equivalent to:  
                                                 
1
1 1
1 0
M
B
VdB dM
V
 

 .     (a7) 
Using (a5) and (a7) implies  
                                                      
1
1
11 0
M
B
V dM
V
     
,  (a8) 
and, with low-skilled agents facing a positive marginal tax, 
1
1 1
M
B
V
V
 

, it follows that 1 0dM   
and 1 0dB  .  
Now define 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ( ) ( ), ) ( , )v v Y M B g Y M Y v C Y       as the maximal value 
function obtained by maximising 1 1 11 2( , , )u x x Y  subject to 
1 1 1
1 2px x C   and subject to the 
constraint 11 1 0x x  . Relating to our previous notation, 1 1 1C Z px  . Assume for 
simplicity that the wage rate of low-skilled agents is equal to one, so that the argument Y1 
becomes a measure of the labour supply of a low-skilled agent.  
Differentiating with respect to Y1, we get the first order condition for an agent’s optimisation: 
31 
 
1
1 1 1
1( ) ' ( (1 '( ))) 0
Y
C
C
vv v g a
v
      .                                                                                                                      
The equation above is equivalent to  
                                               1 1 1( (1 '( )) 0Cv m g a    ,                    (a9) 
where   11 1 1 1 1, Y
C
vm m C Y
v
   , i.e. the compensation required to be willing to increase labour 
supply in order to earn an extra unit of (gross) income. We note that 1 1(1 '( ))m g a  . 
Standard normality assumptions imply that 1 0Cm   and 1 0Ym  , where subscripts denote 
partial derivatives.  
The second order condition of the optimisation problem is 
                                    1 1 1 1 1 1( ) '' ( ''( )) 0
C YC
v v m m m g a     .              (a10) 
Doing comparative statics, we find:  
                                                   
1 1
1
1 0( ) ''
CC
B
v m
Y
v
  .                                            (a11)    
                 
Combining (a10) and (a11) gives: 
                                           
1
1
1 1 1 1''( )
C
C Y
B
m
Y
m m m g a
    .                     (a12)                        
1 1 11
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
''( )
( (1 '( )) ''( ))
( ) '' ''( )
C
C
C Y
C
M
m m g av
Y m g a g a
v m m g a m
       .                                   (a13)     
From (a13) we get:  
       
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
''( ) ''( )
1
''( ) ''( ) ''( )
C C Y Y
C Y C Y C Y
M
m m g a m m g a m m
Y
m m g a m m m g a m m m g a m
            .             (a14) 
Then consider the following expression for the change in avoidance by a low-skilled agent:  
                            1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( 1)
M B
da d Y M dY dM Y dM Y dB         . (a15)                            
Substituting from (a12) and (a14), we get:  
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1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0''( ) ''( )
Y
C Y C Y
C
m m
da dM dB
m m g a m m m g a m
      
 .        (a16)                        
Now consider the topping-up regime where type-1 agents are no-reselling constrained 
whereas type-2 agents are topping up. Then the net-of-transfer tax burden on type-2 agents is 
unaffected; the higher transfer (in kind) due to public provision is exactly offset by a higher 
gross tax payment. With an unchanged government’s net tax revenue requirement, the net tax 
liability of type-1 agents will remain unchanged too, i.e. 1 1M B k  , where k  is a positive 
constant.  
With public provision and a binding no-reselling constraint, 1 1x x , we can write the utility 
of a low-skilled agent as: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1( , ( ), )u x Y k px g Y M Y    . 
With public provision being desirable because it enhances the utility of type-1 agents, 
differentiation yields 
1
1 1 1 11
2 1
2
'( ) 0
u
du u p g a dM
u
      
, where 1 1dx  . Since the no-
reselling constraint implies that 
1
1
1
2
u p
u
 , an increase in utility requires that 1 0dM  . To find 
how Y1 is affected we derive the first order condition for the optimal choice of Y1. For this 
purpose, define     11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 2 1 1 1
2
, , , ( ), Y
um m x x Y m x Y k px g Y M Y
u
       , where, as 
above, subscripts denote partial derivatives. We find:  
    1 1 1 12 1 ( ) 0u u m g a      ,                                                                                              
and the second order condition: 
                           1 1 1 1 1 12 2( ) '' ( (1 '( )) ''( )) 0Yu u m g a m g a      .              (a17) 
              
Doing comparative statics, we can derive the effects of increasing the public provision. First, 
notice that we have:  
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
( '( ) ''( ) )
( ) ''
( '( ) ''( ) )
( (1 '( )) ''( ))
Y
u m dx pm dx m g a dM g a dM
dY
u
u m dx pm dx g a m dM g a dM
u m g a m g a
  
      
   
which simplifies to:                                                                                                            
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
2
'( ) ''( )
(1 '( )) ''( )
Y
m dx pm dx g a m dM g a dMdY
m g a m g a
       . 
 
We can then proceed to calculate the effect on evasion by the low-skilled as follows:  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
2
'( ) ''( )
(1 '( )) ''( )
Y
m dx pm dx g a m dM g a dM
da dY dM dM
m g a m g a
                      
             
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 11 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
(1 '( )) ''( )'( ) ''( )
(1 '( )) ''( ) (1 '( )) ''( )
Y
Y Y
m g a m g am dx pm dx g a m dM g a dM dM
m g a m g a m g a m g a
            ,     (a18) 
 
implying: 
                                         
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 21
1 1 1 1
2 (1 '( )) ''( )
Y
Y
m dx pm dx m dM m dM
da
m g a m g a
       .                           (a19) 
                                             
Consider the case where the direct effect of public provision is to stimulate labour supply by 
reducing the marginal work compensation required, while an increase in other consumption 
raises the required marginal compensation, i.e. 1 0m   and 2 0m  . Then, the denominator of 
the term on the right hand side of (a19) is positive whereas, given that 1 0dM  , the third and 
the fourth term at the numerator are negative. However, the first term at the numerator is 
positive, and, overall, it is conceivable that the effect is large enough to make public provision 
drive up tax evasion when type-1 agents are no-reselling constrained. 
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